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Abstract
This paper examines the Faustian dynamics of policy and power. We posit a general class of
dynamic games in which current policies aﬀect the future distribution of political power, resulting in
the following “Faustian trade oﬀ”: if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy, he then sacriﬁces
future political power; yet if he wants to preserve his future power, he must sacriﬁce his present
policy objectives. The trade-oﬀ comes from the fact that the current political ruler/pivotal voter
cannot un-couple the direct eﬀect of his policy from its indirect eﬀect on future power.
A Policy-endogenous (PE) equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power, and the
resulting evolution of policy and political power over time. We show that the Faustian trade-oﬀ in a
PE equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales. The political preservation eﬀect induces more
tempered policy choices than if one’s policy choice did not aﬀect one’s political fortunes. However,
the reformation eﬀect induces “more aggressive” policies in order to exploit the productivity gains
from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors. We distinguish between political systems
that give rise to monotone Faustian dynamics — political power that progressively evolves toward
more ﬁscally liberal types of leaders, and cyclical Faustian dynamics — political power that oscillates
between liberal and conservative types of leaders. In each case, we show that the Faustian trade oﬀ
moderates the choices of each type of leader.
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In Goethe’s Faust, a well meaning Faust seeks knowledge, truth, and beauty, but cannot
achieve them on his own. The devil appears and strikes a bargain with Faust: the devil will
serve Faust while Faust remains here on earth; in exchange Faust must serve the devil in hell.
But there is a catch. As part of the agreement, if Faust is so happy with the devil’s services
that he wants to “freeze” the present moment forever, Faust must then die immediately.
Hence, the bargain endows Faust with the power to reach his objective but denies him the
ability to savor it.1
So it is, quite often, with “political bargains.” If a political leader chooses a desirable but
unpopular policy, he may lose political power and thus the ability to shape policy in the future.
By opting to stay in power, he sacriﬁces his policy objectives and then faces the same trade-oﬀ
in the future. Hence, the political bargain endows a leader with the power to determine policy
only as long as he does not choose the one he prefers.
These types of “Faustian trade-oﬀs” are not uncommon in politics. In one prominent
example, after signing the Civil Rights Act in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson remarked to
an aid, “We have just lost the South for a generation.” It proved to be a fairly accurate forecast
of Democratic losses to come.2
This paper examines a dynamic game theoretic model of this “Faustian trade-oﬀ” between
policy and power. To highlight the “tragic” nature of this trade oﬀ, we do not presume that
rulers crave power for its own sake. Instead, political actors are assumed to be purely policy-
motivated. Their concern about losing power arises only because the new decision makers
have diﬀerent policy objectives than their own.
We model an ongoing society inhabited by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived citizens. At each
date t, one of the citizens, whom we refer to as the leader has eﬀective authority to choose a
policy that aﬀects all the citizens in society. The “leader” can be viewed as an elected ruler,
or alternatively, as a pivotal voter whose preferences are decisive in determining a policy. In
either case, the policy choice of the leader in date t can change political power in a way that
ultimately changes the identity of the leader in date t + 1. This can be done through policies
that aﬀect the underlying demographic and/or distributional characteristics of the population.
For instance, an increase in a country’s income tax changes the future distribution of income.
In turn, this may bring about electoral changes in future political power.
1While there are many versions of the Faustian Bargain, the most well known is rendered by Goethe in
(translated): Faust: The Tragedy in Two Parts, 1932 (translated in the original metres by Bayard Taylor).
See also www.openlibrary.org/details/faustgoethe00goetiala
2See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon B. Johnson. We thank a referee for pointing out the reference.
See also Black and Black (2002) for a detailed account.
1Because future political power is endogenously driven by current policy change, we refer to
this as a case of policy-endogenous (PE) political power. Under policy-endogenous power, the
dynamics induce a feedback loop from policy to power and back to policy. We characterize the
Policy-endogenous (PE) equilibria — smooth Markov Perfect equilibria in policy-endogenous
regimes.3 As a benchmark, PE equilibrium paths of policy and power are compared to those
resulting from permanent authority (PA) equilibria — equilibria under which political power
is permanent.
In the PE equilibrium, a political leader faces a Faustian trade-oﬀ when his most preferred
policy strips him of power and then places it in the hands of a less desirable ruler. A central
theme to emerge from the study is that Faustian trade oﬀs tend to turn political decision
makers into “Burkean conservatives.” That is, when facing a Faustian trade oﬀ, a leader must
overcompensate for the potential loss of power by slowing the rate of political evolution as
dictated by his current policy choice. This Burkean eﬀect is compounded by the indirect
eﬀect one’s decision has on the policies of future leaders: a ﬁscal conservative whose preferred
policy might lead to an electoral loss to a moderate should worry that the moderate’s choice
might lead to an electoral loss to a ﬁscal liberal in the longer term. The result is that political
shifts and policy changes are more gradual than they would be if these sorts of trade oﬀs went
unrecognized.
While an abundant literature in political economy studies the link from political power
to policy, less is known about the “reverse causal link,” i.e., from policy to power. One
reason for this is that much of the “ﬁrst generation” political economy literature studied
“undistorted” political mechanisms combining standard majority voting with order-preserving
policy changes in population distribution.4 In these models an individual who, for instance, is
richer than another today is still expected to be richer after the policy change goes into eﬀect.
Consequently, a ﬁxed median voter emerges in equilibrium, and so no change in political power
occurs.
The traditional emphasis on “undistorted” systems is a natural starting point. Yet, biases
that produce policy-endogenous distortions have, historically, been the rule rather than the
exception. Until the late 19th century, most governments explicitly weighted votes by some
form of wealth or property value. In democracies today the bias is less formulaic but no
less real. Representation in the U.S. Senate, for example, is biased in favor of less populous
states, hence toward characteristics of rural rather than urban voters. Small minority parties
in parliamentary systems often have disproportionate inﬂuence in the formation of majority
governments. In addition, recent studies by Benabou (2000), Campante (2007), and Bartels
3The restriction to Markov Perfection is fairly common in dynamic political games (see, for instance,
Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008)). There is some justiﬁcation for this, which is detailed in Section 2.
4See, for example, political economy models of growth and taxation such as Bertola (1993), Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), Krusell et. al. (1996, 1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999). For a detailed review of papers
in this tradition, see Krusell et al (1997) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2(2008) all document the wealth-bias implicit in the U.S. political system.
By themselves, these biases may not create a Faustian trade oﬀ. However, policy choices
typically have distributional eﬀects — changes in, say, income inequality — and we show that
these eﬀects can create a Faustian trade oﬀ when coupled with the political bias.
Something akin to a Faustian trade oﬀ arises in some recent studies of endogenous electoral
outcomes. These include Besley and Coate (1998), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Hassler,
et. al. (2003), Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004), Ortega (2005), Hassler, et. al. (2005), Azzimonti
(2005), Campante (2007), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). Many of these focus on way in
which particular political mechanisms such as Downsian competition aﬀect future voter pref-
erences. These and other related papers are discussed in more detail in Section 5. We are not
aware of a systemic study that identiﬁes common features of the Faustian trade oﬀ (including
the longer term indirect eﬀects mentioned above) across a large sweep of environments and
political systems. This paper builds on the recent literature by working toward that end.
We develop the model in two stages. First, we posit a stylized model of public investment
in which the level of investment augments a public capital good such as infrastructure or
education. We then extend the results to a general (non-parametric) model. Each model
features a “detail free” mechanism by which the policy-power link is speciﬁed in reduced
form as a function from population characteristics to the type or identity of the leader. This
mechanism is later “endogenized” by showing that any member of the class of reduced form
functions considered here can be generated by a majority voting rule in which votes are
weighted by wealth or income.
We analyze both transition dynamics and steady state properties of the model. In the
stylized model, the Faustian trade oﬀ moderates each leader’s incentives to invest in public
capital. For instance, when public capital is below its equilibrium steady state level, each
leader chooses a lower level of government investment than he would if his authority were
permanent. Likewise, starting above the steady state investment, a leader chooses a larger
investment than if his power were permanent. As a consequence, public capital initially
changes more slowly than it would in the absence of a Faustian trade oﬀ.
Yet, despite the moderating eﬀect on individual incentives, political power does evolve
over time. We distinguish between two cases: monotone and cyclical dynamics. Monotone
dynamics arise in polities with a reinforcing distortion — a distortion that reinforces the
natural pattern of capital accumulation. In this case, it means that an increase in public
capital moves political power progressively toward more ﬁscally liberal types who prefer larger
increases in government spending. In turn, this leads to even larger increases in spending in
the future. Viewed in this way, the virtually uninterrupted increase in overall U.S. government
expenditures after World-War II can be interpreted as both a cause and an consequence of a
3gradual political shift in preferences toward a greater role for government.5
By contrast, cyclical dynamics arise only in polities with countervailing distortion — a
distortion that runs counter to the pattern of capital accumulation. Increases (decreases) in
public capital move political power toward more ﬁscally conservative (liberal) leaders. This
results in oscillations between liberal and conservative types. Each type’s policy moves power
toward the other side of the political spectrum. A natural example of this is immigration
policy. Ortega (2005) presents a calibrated model of skill complementarities with a counter-
vailing distortion. By allowing in immigrants with complementary skills, voters from one skill
group endogenously increase the political opposition, since the immigrants will have opposing
political preferences regarding the composition of immigration in the future.
We also compare two political institutions of diﬀering degrees of the same type of distortion.
The result is somewhat surprising. Using the monotone case to illustrate, we show that there
exists a cutoﬀ state above which the more distorted polity yields more liberal leaders, and
below which it yields more conservative leaders. In other words, the more distorted polity
yields a more gradual evolution of power in the short run, and a less gradual evolution in the
long run. The short-run-long-run distinction is signiﬁcant because it indicates that there are
critical features in the transition dynamics of the Faustian model that would not be evident
by focusing only on its steady state properties.
The monotone results are generalized in the non-parametric model. When certain su-
permodularity restrictions hold, the main results characterize Policy-endogenous equilibria in
terms of a “distortion-adjusted” Euler equation in which a leader’s motives may be decom-
posed into the following two rationales.
First, the “political preservation eﬀect” turns all leaders into Burkean conservatives re-
gardless of political preference. That is, each leader chooses more moderately/less aggressively
than he would if he did not face a Faustian trade oﬀ. Roughly, the political preservation eﬀect
represents the distortion in the current leader’s incentives due to the eﬀect his policy choice
has on the identities of future leaders. Because policy preferences across individuals diﬀer,
each distinct leader determines a distinct policy rule. Hence a change in current policy alters
the trajectory of policy rules (rather than just the policies). The larger the wedge between
current and future leaders’ preferences, the greater the distortion. As a result, today’s leader
slows the rate of political change with his policy choice. We show that the preservation eﬀect
on a given individual’s incentives increases in magnitude through time.
Yet, the preservation eﬀect is partly oﬀset by a second rationale, the “reformation eﬀect,”
which represents the distortion in the current leader’s incentives due to the eﬀect his policy
choice has on policies (rather than policy rules) chosen in the subsequent period. The ref-
ormation eﬀect isolates the eﬀect of current policy on next period’s productivity by ignoring
5See Peltzman (1980), Husted and Kenny (1997), and Lott and Kenny (1999).
4the changes to future policy rules themselves. Looking just at productivity, a more aggressive
policy choice in the subsequent period increases the marginal productivity of policies in the
present. In short, the reformation eﬀect pushes the current leader toward a more aggressive
policy choice.
While the preservation and reformation eﬀects refer to distorted incentives of a ﬁxed deci-
sion maker, it is important to remember that decision authority changes hands over time. The
overall eﬀect is that power evolves toward more progressive leaders, and, in fact, the policy
trajectory is more progressive than under permanent authority in the long run. The steady
state stock is larger and the leader more progressive, than in a case of no Faustian trade oﬀs.
The general model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 elaborates on the parametric
model. The model displays some of the salient features of political systems that gives rise
to policy-endogenous power. Section 4 returns to the abstract model and contains the main
decomposition result. Section 5 examines the related literature and examples. Finally, Section
6 discusses various extensions. The proofs are contained in an Appendix at the end.
2 The Basic Setup
In this Section, we describe a general model in which Faustian tradeoﬀs occur. The level of
generality underscores the fact that policy endogenous political change is not necessarily an
isolated feature of a small set of environments. However, for concreteness a special case of
the general model is presented in Section 3 in the form of a stylized model of public sector
investment and growth.
2.1 The Environment
At each date t = 0,1,2,... a government must undertake a policy decision that aﬀects all
members of society. The policy interacts with a state variable that fully summarizes the
economy at that date. Let at denote the policy choice and ωt the state. Feasible policies and
states are restricted to compact intervals.
The state is assumed to evolve according to a deterministic Markov process determining
the future state as a function of current states and actions. The transition function Q is
assumed smooth, nondecreasing in ωt, increasing in at, and jointly concave in the pair ωt and
at.
Society is comprised of continuum I = [0,1] of inﬁnitely lived citizen-types. Given any





where δ is a common discount factor, and the payoﬀ function u is smooth, increasing in ωt,
decreasing and strictly concave in at, and jointly concave in the pair ωt and at.
The assumptions on u and Q reﬂect the idea that the policy at is a tax or public investment
that, while costly in the present, augments the future value of the state. In turn, the state ωt
is a parameter that determines a capital stock or income distribution. An obvious example is
an income tax that generates revenue to fund public infrastructure.
2.2 The Permanent Authority Benchmark
Consider a benchmark case of a decision maker who faces no Faustian trade-oﬀ. There are
a few ways this can happen. For instance, if all individuals have identical preferences over
policy, then a purely policy-motivated type is indiﬀerent between retaining and losing political
power. Alternatively, an individual can lose power for purely exogenous reasons unrelated to
his current policy choice.
The most natural benchmark, however, is that of an individual who maintains political
power regardless of his policy action. This “king” or “dictator,” whom we label i0, chooses a
policy at at each date t, fully anticipating that his authority is perpetual. We refer to this as
the permanent authority (PA) regime. PA regimes are not, almost by deﬁnition, common in
modern democracies. They were common, however, in many European monarchies prior to
the 20th century.
The PA regime can also be interpreted normatively as a time-consistent social planner.
In our model, there is no qualitative diﬀerence between the permanent authority of a ﬁxed
citizen-type, and the authority of a social planner who aggregates payoﬀs across citizen-types.
Signiﬁcantly, most political economy models either assume explicitly a PA regime (e.g., a social
planner) or derive one in equilibrium under special assumptions on preferences, technology,
and political institutions.
Consider the problem of a permanent authority i0. His policy choices are characterized
by a policy function ψ(ωt) = at (omitting the notational dependence on i0) that solves the
Bellman equation
V (i0,ωt;ψ) = max
at
[u(i0,ωt,at) + δ V (i0,ωt+1;ψ)] (2)
subject to ωt+1 = Q(ωt,at). We refer to the function ψ that solves (2) as a Permanent
6Authority (PA) equilibrium. The PA equilibrium serves as a baseline for comparison.6
2.3 Policy-Endogenous Political Power
We compare the PA regime in which there are no Faustian trade oﬀs to one in which there
are. In an environment with policy endogenous (PE) political power, the current policy choices
induce changes in future political power. To focus on decision-theoretic aspects, political power
is modeled in reduced form by assuming that each period the political system produces an
outcome that is rationalized by the preferences of a pivotal individual. This individual (e.g.,
pivotal voter or political leader) is, in eﬀect, endowed with the exclusive right in period t to
choose the policy action at. The assumption that the political process admits a pivotal leader
clearly involves some loss of generality. There are, however, commonly known conditions
on policy preferences, notably the class of intermediate preferences (Grandmont (1978)), and
preferences satisfying single crossing properties (Gans and Smart (1996) and Rothstein (1990))
that do admit pivotal voters.
Henceforth, we refer to the pivotal decision maker as the leader. Political power is therefore
represented by a mapping from states (e.g., capital stocks, income distributions) to citizen-
types. Formally, the mapping is assumed to be a smooth, weakly monotone function µ : ω 7→ i
such that it = µ(ωt) is the leader who decides on policy in state ωt.
Because µ determines “who’s in charge” in each state, we refer to it as the authority
function. The key attribute of an authority function, for our purposes, is that it admits the
possibility that political power changes endogenously due to changes in the state. Current
policy changes produce changes in the state which, in turn, produce changes in the identity
of the leader through µ.
To facilitate a comparison with the PA regime, we ﬁx i0 as both the permanent authority
and the initial decision maker under policy-endogenous power. The change in the identity of
the leader, as described by µ, deﬁnes a dynamic game with a potentially inﬁnite set of players.
The players’ choices result in a stationary Markov process that realizes states {ω0,ω1,ω2,...,},
leaders {i0,i1,i2,...,}, and policies {a0,a1,a2,...}. We refer to these processes as the Faustian
dynamics of PE political power.
In much of the paper, µ is treated as exogenous, although we give an explicit micro
foundation for it in Section 3. In the simplest case of majority voting, µ(ωt) is the median type
whenever the Median Voter Theorem holds. However, in order to obtain a state-dependent
6Implicitly, the PA equilibrium characterizes a time consistent optimal strategy for i0 if the private sector’s
dynamic response is Markov or is absent altogether. In the case where the private sector is absent, the PA
equilibrium amounts to a single agent dynamic programming problem, in which case it coincides with the full
commitment solution.
7authority function µ, votes in some cases may need to be weighted by, say, wealth or income.
The idea roughly is that changes in the state “distort” the income distribution, and wealth-
weighted voting is sensitive to these types of distortions — see Section 3 for an explicit
description of such a voting mechanism.
This sensitivity of voting to changes in the wealth distribution could be explicitly built
in to the polity as in the case of the U.S. Senate or in Germany in the 19th century. In
other cases, the sensitivity is implicit such as when a citizen’s political inﬂuence depends on
his wealth.7 Hence, policy changes such as tax cuts may change the identity of the pivotal
voter in a heterogeneous economy if campaign contributions aﬀect the outcome of an election.
Alternatively, changes in immigration laws, education levels, or fertility policy can have (longer
run) electoral eﬀects even under ordinary median voter rules, since the demographic changes
themselves may be biased toward the participation of certain groups or social classes. For
example, Tichenor (2002) describes 19th century immigration policy in the U.S., sometimes
restrictive but more often expansive, that ultimately brought about large political shifts toward
urban regions that came to be reﬂected in congressional and presidential elections.
Under PE power generally, the leader it = µ(ωt) in period t chooses an action at an-
ticipating the eﬀect that it has on the future trajectory of states, leaders, and policies. A
Policy-Endogenous (PE) equilibrium is deﬁned as a Markov Perfect equilibrium in the PE
environment. More precisely, a PE equilibrium, denoted by Ψ∗, is a Markov policy function
(with Ψ∗(ωt) = at) such that Ψ∗ is a best response by citizen-type i against any history-
contingent strategy that diﬀers from Ψ∗ only in states ω for which µ(ω) = i.8 Under Ψ∗, the








given the sequence {ωt} induced by transition function Q. A standard argument shows that the
so-called one-shot deviation principle applies to PE equilibria. Namely, Ψ∗ is a PE equilibrium
if and only if for all ωt, and for all at,
V (µ(ωt),ωt;Ψ
∗) ≥ u(µ(ωt),ωt,at) + δ V (µ(ωt),Q(ωt,at);Ψ
∗) (4)
Clearly, there are other types of Subgame Perfect equilibria one might examine in a Faus-
tian model. However, we think the restriction to Markov Perfection is sensible in this context.
7 Polities that weight votes by wealth, at least implicitly, are not exotic. Benabou (2000), Bartels (2008),
and Campante (2007) all provide evidence of bias toward the aﬄuent in U.S. electoral politics. They show
that campaign contributions (Campante) or diﬀerential turnout rates (Benabou, Bartels) produce roughly the
same eﬀect as if the votes were weighted by wealth.
8To be clear, it should be noted that Markov Perfect equilibria can be alternatively described as Subgame
Perfect equilibria in Markov strategies. This means that feasible strategies and payoﬀs, fully described, may
possibly vary with the entire history. For brevity, however, we omit the full description of such strategies and
payoﬀs and limit our description to payoﬀs evaluated by equilibrium (Markov) stategies.
8First, it facilitates a direct comparison with the permanent authority equilibrium in (2). Sec-
ond, the restriction seems natural in large populations. Costs of coordination are presumably
higher in larger economies, and so strategies that therefore depend only on the current, payoﬀ
relevant state may reduce these costs. Third, if policy-makers have uniformly bounded recall
then it can be shown that any Subgame Perfect equilibrium in our model must be Markov.9
Given a PE equilibrium Ψ∗, consider what policy would have been chosen in state ωt by
an arbitrary citizen-type i? This question is hypothetical because an arbitrary i is not the
authority in state ωt unless it happens that i = it = µ(ωt). The question is important
nevertheless because it allows one to compare the Faustian incentives for diﬀerent political
types in any situation. Let at = Ψ(i,ωt) denote the hypothetical decision of type i. Call Ψ a
hypothetical equilibrium if for all ωt, all i and all at
u(i,ωt,Ψ(i,ωt)) + δ V (i, Q(ωt,Ψ(i,ωt));Ψ
∗) ≥ u(i,ωt,at) + δ V (i,Q(ωt,at);Ψ
∗) (5)
The inequality in (5) coincides with (4) in those states for which i = µ(ωt). The hypothetical
equilibrium and the PE equilibrium are therefore related by Ψ(µ(ωt),ωt) = Ψ∗(ωt).
Hence, starting from initial state ω0, the decision maker i0 chooses Ψ(i0,ω0) ≡ Ψ∗(ω0).
Type i0 correctly anticipates that his chosen policy a0 leads to a possible change in decision
authority at date t = 1. This change is given by i1 = µ(ω1) where next period’s state ω1 is
determined by ω1 = Q(ω0,Ψ∗(ω0)). It is generally true that Ψ(i0,ω1) 6= Ψ∗(ω1) because i0
no longer makes the decision in state ω1 in the PE equilibrium, and the decision type i1 will
generally have diﬀerent preferences over policy. The more interesting comparison, however, is
between Ψ(i0,ω1) and ψ(ω1). It tells us how an arbitrary citizen-type would react to the loss
of power in a given state, where the extent of the loss is determined by that state.
In certain instances, the current leader faces no Faustian trade-oﬀ even when µ is distor-
tionary. For instance, suppose that period payoﬀs are of the form u(i,ω,a) = u1(i)+u2(ω,a)
or the form u1(i)u2(ω,a). In either case, the additive or multiplicative separability implies
that individual-speciﬁc characteristics do not aﬀect policy preferences. Individuals’ policy
preferences are therefore the same, and so changes in power have no eﬀect on policy.
3 A Stylized Model of Public Sector Investment
This Section examines how Faustian dynamics work in a concrete, special case of the general
model. We examine a stylized model of public sector investment where political authority is
9An economy has uniformly bounded recall if there is a ﬁnite bound m such that every decision maker’s
memory of the past history cannot exceed m periods back. The argument for the stated assertion relies on
asynchronous decision making, which applies to the present model. A simple proof is found in Bhaskar and
Vega-Redondo (2002).
9derived explicitly from a system of weighted voting. We examine two cases. One where the
public sector expands monotonically as political power steadily evolves toward more ﬁscally
liberal types. The other where public sector alternately expands and contracts and political
power oscillates between ﬁscally liberal and conservative types of decision makers. We use
the model to illustrate eﬀects of Faustian dynamics on the evolution of political power, public
sector growth, and income inequality.
3.1 The Environment
Society invests each period in a public capital good (infrastructure) which is produced accord-
ing to the linear transition
ωt+1 = Q(ωt,at) = (1 − d)ωt + at. (6)
Here, ωt is the current stock of public capital, at is public investment, and d ∈ (0,1] is the
depreciation rate. Public investment at is produced from a lump sum tax Tt, according to a
concave production technology at = (2Tt)1/2. This technology can be alternatively expressed
as the cost Tt = 1
2a2
t of providing public investment at.
Each citizen is assumed to provide labor inelastically with a time allocation normalized to
one. His labor is combined with public capital to produce income
y (i,ωt) = g (i) + f(i)ωt
with g(i) and f(i) denoting type i’s eﬃciency utilization of labor and capital, respectively. We
assume that f0 ≥ 0, so that higher types have (weakly) higher eﬃciency utilization of public
capital.
A citizen’s ﬂow payoﬀ is assumed to be linear in his consumption, and we assume (without
loss of generality, due to the linear payoﬀ) that there is no private borrowing or saving. A
citizen therefore consumes his after-tax income y (i,ωt) − Tt. His ﬂow payoﬀ is then given by
u = y (i,ωt) − Tt = g (i) + f(i)ωt −
a2
2
Dropping the labor eﬃciency term g(i) yields an indirect utility function of the form in (1),
given by





Notice that the idiosyncratic labor productivity g(i) drops out of (7) as it plays no role in
citizen i’s policy preference. However, g(i) will play an indirect role in the evolution of the
economy through its eﬀect on the political process.
103.2 A Voting Foundation for µ
The stylized model has a natural political interpretation. The state ω may be regarded as
a proxy for the size of government. Hence, the assumption f0 ≥ 0 implies that the dynamic
policy preferences are well ordered: higher types are more “ ﬁscally liberal” in the sense that
they prefer a larger public sector.10 Given preferences satisfying (7), one can show that the
Median Voter Theorem applies. Hence, any voting system, regardless of the way in which
votes are weighted admits a pivotal voter whose preferred policy choice beats any other in a
pairwise comparison.
One such voting system is that of wealth-weighted voting discussed in Section 2. Speciﬁ-
cally, consider a polity that allocates y(i,ωt) votes to each type i in state ωt.11 Then, applying
the Median Voter Theorem (where “median” is wealth-weighted here), the authority function







0 [g(i) + f(i)ω]di
R 1





Hence, while order-preserving shifts in the wealth distribution do not change the median
voter, they do change the wealth-weighted pivotal voter. In this case, µ increases (decreases)
whenever Lorenz inequality increases (decreases) in the state ωt.
An authority function µ can therefore be computed from (8) given functions f and g. A
particularly tractable form of µ, given by
it = µ(ωt) =
κ0 + κωt
κ0 + κωt + 1
with parameters κ and κ0 > 0, may be obtained from a marginal eﬃciency f satisfying:
f(i) = i
1−i for all i ≤ ¯ i, and f(i) = f(¯ i) for all i ≥ ¯ i. The marginal labor eﬃciency g can
easily be backed out using (8). The details are contained in a technical appendix.12
For the purposes of solving the model, the most relevant property of this construction is
that for all ωt,
f(µ(ωt)) = κ0 + κωt (9)
10To see this, observe that when ﬂow payoﬀs satisfy (7), the value function is an aﬃne function of f(i)
regardless of the policy function Ψ∗:
V (i,ωt;Ψ∗) = f (i)V 1(ωt;Ψ∗) + V 2(ωt;Ψ∗).
11In general, we could have considered any weighting system that places positive weight on one’s in-
come/wealth. See Footnote 7 for real world examples.
12See www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunofr/onlineappendix.pdf.
11In other words, authority is given to the type it for whom the marginal value of public sector
capital is an aﬃne function of the stock itself. Increases in the stock therefore correspond to
more ﬁscally liberal authorities (for κ > 0). By varying parameters κ and κ0 such that all
authority functions intersect the initial point (ω0,i0), Equation (9) maps out a one-dimensional
class of authority functions, each of which diﬀers by the adjustment speed and direction of
political power.13
Figure 1 illustrates three examples of authority functions that satisfy (9). In the Figure,
µ◦, µ0, and µ00 correspond to parameter values for κ = 0,κ0,κ00, respectively, where 0 < κ0 < κ00.
The special case of κ = 0 corresponds to the “undistorted” case of permanent authority, with
i0 as the permanent leader. Clearly there is no Faustian trade-oﬀ for i0 in this case. When
κ = 0, it is not hard to show that the PA equilibrium is state-invariant: ψ(ωt) = ¯ ψ.14
The value |κ| measures the degree of institutional distortion. An increase in |κ| (while
adjusting κ0 to keep the same initial point) implies faster structural evolution of political
authority. In the Figure, µ0 and µ00 both begin with i0 as the initial decision maker. The
function µ0 is “less distorted” than µ00 in the sense that µ00 oﬀers a starker Faustian trade-oﬀ
for leader i0. Intuitively, one might call µ0 more “conservative” in the “Burkean” sense of
oﬀering a more gradual structural evolution of political power; µ00 is more “progressive” in
the sense of inducing accelerated change. A central feature of the Faustian model, as we later
show, is that equilibrium responses of individuals may undercut this seemingly straightforward
comparison: the more conservative rule does not always produce a more gradual evolution of
political authority in equilibrium.
In either case, κ > 0 implies that µ is increasing. An increase in public sector capital
therefore adjusts political power upward toward more ﬁscally liberal types — those with
higher marginal value of government expenditure. But more liberal types choose higher levels
of government expenditure which increase the public capital stock. In this sense, µ represents
a reinforcing distortion. If instead, κ < 0, then an increase in public capital would adjust
political power downward, toward the more conservative “small government” types. In that
case, because the authority function µ moves in opposition to the transition technology, it
represents a countervailing distortion.
13This class of authority functions are those that satisfy µ(ωt) = f−1(κ0 +κωt) such that κ and κ0 satisfy
the linear equation f(i0) = κ0 + κω0.
14 Because f (i) is a monotone function, the Permanent Authority equilibrium can be identiﬁed as a solution
to a social planner’s problem. To see this, suppose that h is a density on [0,1] in which h(i) is the welfare




In other words, the social welfare function coincides with the utility function of a specially chosen i0. Therefore,










Figure 1: Authority Functions in the Policy-Endogenous and Permanent Power Regimes
3.3 Monotone Faustian Dynamics
Consider ﬁrst the case of κ > 0, thus a reinforcing distortion. Since µ slopes upward, increases
in public capital put power in the hands of more ﬁscally liberal leaders. In the following result,
ψ refers to the state-invariant Permanent Authority (PA) equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider any authority function µ satisfying (9). If 0 < κ < d
 
1
δ − 1 + d

,
then the following hold.
(i) There exist an increasing, aﬃne Policy-Endogenous (PE) equilibrium policy rule Ψ∗(ωt)
and a nonincreasing, aﬃne Hypothetical rule Ψ(i0,ωt), each of which are unique in the
corresponding class of aﬃne equilibria.
(ii) The PE equilibrium path of states {ωt} converges monotonically to a unique steady state
ω∗ = Q(ω∗,Ψ∗(ω∗)). If ω0 < ω∗, then ω0 < ωt implies Ψ(i0,ωt) < ψ(ωt) and Ψ(i0,ωt) <
Ψ∗(ωt). Whereas if ω0 > ω∗, then ωt < ω0 implies Ψ(i0,ωt) > ψ(ωt) and Ψ(i0,ωt) >
Ψ∗(ωt).
13(iii) If ω0 < ω∗, then there exists a state ˆ ω with ω0 < ˆ ω < ω∗ such that
Ψ
∗(ωt) < ψ(ωt) ∀ω0 ≤ ωt < ˆ ω
Ψ
∗(ωt) > ψ(ωt) ∀ωt > ˆ ω
whereas if ω0 > ω∗, then there exists a state ˆ ω with ω∗ < ˆ ω < ω0 such that
Ψ
∗ (ωt) > ψ (ωt) ∀ˆ ω < ωt ≤ ω0
Ψ
∗ (ωt) < ψ (ωt) ωt < ˆ ω
The upper bound on κ is required to satisfy a transversality condition that bounds the
rate of growth. The Proof in the Appendix shows that the policy function of the aﬃne form
Ψ∗(ωt) = (d − K)ω∗ + Kωt where K is a constant (in ωt) with 0 ≤ K < d, and ω∗ is the
unique steady state. The coeﬃcients implicitly vary in the exogenous parameters κ0, κ, δ,
and depreciation rate d.
Parts (ii) and (iii) state what will turn to be quite general properties of Faustian dynamics.
Part (ii) compares the Hypothetical rule to both the PE and PA rules. If the initial state is
below the steady state, then political power evolves from ﬁscally conservative toward more
ﬁscally liberal types. By choosing a smaller expansion in government expenditures than he
would if his power were permanent, type i0 slows the rate of political change as it evolves
away from his type. In this sense ﬁscal conservatism coincides with “Burkean” conservatism.
By contrast, when the initial state is above the steady state, then political power evolves
from ﬁscally liberal toward ﬁscally conservative types. In that case, type i0, a ﬁscal liberal,
acts as a Burkean conservative by choosing a larger expansion in government expenditures
than he would if his power were permanent. By doing so, he once again slows the rate of
political change.
For purposes of intuition, we restrict our discussion and pictures to the case of ω0 <
ω∗. Then the (hypothetical) policies of leader i0 become more conservative over time/states
because more distant types assume power as the state progresses upward. But, as Part (iii)
shows, individual caution is juxtaposed with progressive evolution of policy. The Policy-
Endogenous equilibrium starts out more conservative than Permanent Authority, but winds
up more ﬁscally liberal in long run. The intuition is as follows. Consider the incentives of the
initial leader i0. He anticipates a growing economy under Ψ∗. However, i0 also anticipates
the corresponding shift of power to more liberal types in the future. Because the higher tax
rates chosen by these liberal types are undesirable from i0’s viewpoint, i0 slows the process
of political evolution toward these types by choosing a lower tax rate than even he himself
would want. The fact that Ψ(i0,ωt) is decreasing in the state demonstrates, in fact, that the
incentive to “slow things up” intensiﬁes the larger is the public sector. This is seen in the
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Figure 2: Monotone Policy Functions & Monotone Transition Dynamics in the PE and PA
Equilibria.
θ(ωt) = Q(ωt,ψ(ωt)) for PA, Θ∗(ωt) = Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) for PE, and Θ(i0,ωt) = Q(ωt,Ψ(i0,ωt))
for Hypothetical PE, respectively.
This “Faustian” motive for gradualism described above can be identiﬁed in the leader’s
Euler equation. Using the parametric assumptions, the value function for the current leader









+ δ V (i,ωt+1; Ψ
∗)

subject to ωt+1 = (1 − d)ωt +at
(10)
If Ψ∗(ωt) lies in the interior of the feasible policy space, then it satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion15
0 = −Ψ
∗(ωt) + δDωt+1V (it,(1 − d)ωt + Ψ
∗(ωt); Ψ
∗). (11)
The ﬁrst term is clearly the marginal cost of an increase in government spending, while the
second is the discounted marginal beneﬁt in the future. Consider next period’s decision from
the point of view of the current decision maker it. Since next period’s decision maker it+1 is
diﬀerent from it, the decision next period induces a marginal distortion away from it’s optimal
policy choice in t + 1. This distortion is given by
∆(it,ωt+1;Ψ
∗) = −Ψ
∗(ωt+1) + δDωt+2V (it,(1 − d)ωt+1 + Ψ
∗(ωt+1); Ψ
∗). (12)
Notice that the right-hand side of (12) is of the same form as (11), shifted one period ahead.
Intuitively, because the government’s capital stock ωt increases, power shifts toward policy
15Throughout the paper, the partial derivative of a function F(x,y) is expressed as DxF.
15makers who prefer higher levels of government spending. Hence, ∆(it,ωt+1;Ψ∗) < 0 since it+1
chooses a higher level of spending than it himself would choose in state ωt+1.
Diﬀerentiating the value function V in (10), substituting in the distortion equation (12),
and iterating one period, the discounted marginal beneﬁt Dωt+1V (it,ωt+1; Ψ∗) of an increase
in current investment can now be expressed as
Dωt+1V (it,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) = [f (it) + (1 − d)Ψ
∗(ωt+1)] + [(K + 1 − d)∆(it,ωt+1; Ψ
∗)]
(13)
The marginal continuation value Dωt+1V can be decomposed into two eﬀects. The ﬁrst brack-
eted term [·] on the right-hand side describes the direct eﬀect that current policy has on next
period’s state. This term also exists (is non-zero) under permanent authority, although the
particular values diﬀer between the two regimes. We refer to this diﬀerence (between PE
and PA) as the reformation eﬀect since it describes the net direct incentive to increase public
investment via changes in the marginal value of public sector capital. The reformation eﬀect
does not include the “Faustian” distortion in incentives due to endogenous change in future
leadership. This distortion is captured by the second bracketed term [·]. This term exists only
in policy-endogenous decision problems. This distortion creates the “Burkean” incentive by
all leaders to slow the evolution of political power as it moves away from the current leader.
This is seen by the fact ∆(it,ωt+1; Ψ∗) < 0. Hence, we refer to it as the political preservation
eﬀect. General properties of both these eﬀects are described in the next Section.
Consider the decision of i0 at date 0. His PE policy may be well below his PA policy, and
it takes time before the PE path overtakes that of permanent authority. Part (iii) shows that
this eventually happens (see Fig. 2). For ωt close to ω0, the leader-type it is not so diﬀerent
from i0, and so the preference for conservative change may place Ψ∗(ωt) below ψ(ωt) for a
time.
Notice ﬁnally that the Faustian dynamics of states and leaders also moves monotonically.
To see this, observe that if ω0 is close to zero, it lies below the steady state. Hence, the equi-
librium state transition Θ∗(ωt) ≡ Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) is increasing in the state, and, consequently,
the equilibrium paths {ωt} and {it} are increasing. This is illustrated in the second diagram
in Fig. 2 which displays the comparison between the PE transition Θ∗, the hypothetical
transition Θ, and the PA transition θ.
So far, we have compared the PE to the PA regime. But this comparison can be applied
to any two PE political institutions, one yielding more gradual change in political power than
the other. This was illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 2 Consider two authority functions µ and e µ, each corresponding to a parameter








Figure 3: Comparison of Two Political Institutions
κ > e κ ≥ 0 (and, consequently, κ0 < e κ0). Let Ψ∗ and e Ψ denote Policy-Endogenous (PE)
equilibria under µ and e µ respectively, and let ω∗ and e ω denote their corresponding (unique)
steady states. Then ω∗ > e ω iﬀ ω0 < ω∗. Furthermore, if ω0 < ω∗, then there exists a state ˆ ω
with ω0 < ˆ ω < ω∗ such that
Ψ
∗ (ωt) < e Ψ(ωt) whenever ω0 ≤ ωt < ˆ ω
Ψ
∗ (ωt) > e Ψ(ωt) whenever ωt > ˆ ω.
whereas if ω0 > ω∗, then there exists a state ˆ ω with ω∗ < ˆ ω < ω0 such that
Ψ
∗ (ωt) > e Ψ(ωt) whenever ˆ ω < ωt ≤ ω0,
Ψ
∗ (ωt) < e Ψ(ωt) whenever ωt < ˆ ω.
Recall that if κ > e κ, then µ gives a faster structural evolution of political power, while e µ
is more gradual. The intuition is the same as in Part (iii) of Proposition 1. Decision makers
respond to a more distorted political institution µ, by choosing more conservative responses.
Initially, this Burkean incentive eﬀect outweighs the structural eﬀect from the authority func-
tions. Hence, the more distorted institution µ initially produces a slower evolution of power
and policy than the less distorted one e µ. However, in the long run (including but not restricted
to steady states), structural features take over and the more distorted polity produces a faster
evolution of leaders and policies. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
173.4 Cyclical Faustian Dynamics
Now consider κ < 0, the case of countervailing distortion. Since µ slopes downward, increased
public investment places power in more ﬁscally conservative citizen-types.







1+δ (1 − d) + 1
δ

, then the following hold.
(i) There exist a decreasing aﬃne Policy-Endogenous (PE) equilibrium policy rule Ψ∗ (ωt)
and a nonincreasing, aﬃne hypothetical rule Ψ(i0,ωt), each of which are unique in the
corresponding class of aﬃne equilibria.
(ii) The PE equilibrium path of states {ωt} converges to a unique steady state ω∗. If κ >
−1−d
δ , then the convergence is monotonic. However, if κ < −1−d
δ , then the economy
follows a dampened cycle converging to ω∗ such that ωt < ω∗ if and only if ωt+1 > ω∗.
In either case, if ω0 < ω∗, then ω0 < ωt implies Ψ∗ (ωt) < Ψ(i0,ωt) < ψ (ωt), whereas if
ω0 > ω∗, then ωt < ω0 implies Ψ∗ (ωt) > Ψ(i0,ωt) > ψ (ωt).
Faustian dynamics can therefore produce political cycles when the authority function is
suﬃciently distorted downward. The intuition, roughly, is that the evolution of political power
counters the evolution of public sector capital. Hence, when ﬁscally liberal types choose high
expenditures, leading to increases in capital stock, this induces a steep drop in the index i
that determines the progressivity of the political type. More ﬁscally conservative types then
lower expenditures which, in turn, produce more liberal types, and so on.
Since µ slopes downward, then whenever the government’s capital stock increases, political
power moves downward toward more ﬁscally conservative types. Consequently, the preserva-
tion eﬀect induces the initial, liberal, leader to decrease expenditures and hence slow the
evolution of political authority as it moves downward. See Figures 4 and 5.
4 A General Monotone Model
This Section returns to the basic setup in Section 2. For tractability, we restrict attention
to increasing authority functions. As before, we compare the PE equilibrium Ψ∗, the PA
equilibrium ψ, and the hypothetical rule Ψ(i0,·).
The main results characterize properties of smooth-limit equilibria, which we deﬁne below.
A natural decomposition of the Euler equation is established in which the “Burkean” incentives




























































Figure 5: Cycles with Countervailing Bias
19that the public investment model of the previous section is a special case of the general model
examined here. All the results of this Section apply there as well. The proofs are in the
Appendix.
Smoothness (diﬀerentiability) plays a crucial role in our characterization. We use it to
examine properties of the Euler equations, roughly following an approach dating back to
Basar and Olsder (1982) for dynamic stochastic games.16 Results in Judd (2004) suggest
that smoothness is a natural selection device when multiple equilibria exist. Formally, a
PE equilibrium Ψ∗ and PA equilibrium ψ are smooth-limit equilibria if (i) Ψ∗ and ψ are
diﬀerentiable in the state; (ii) the resulting policies and Ψ∗(ωt) and ψ(ωt) lie in the interior of
the feasible policy space, and (iii) Ψ∗ and ψ are the limit of smooth, ﬁnite horizon PE and PA
equilibria, resp. Property (iii) is not necessary in the following characterization of the Euler
equation. It is only used later when time-iteration of the value function is the most convenient
way of establishing monotonicity in the state.
Issues of equilibrium existence are not explored here. There are, in fact, general existence
results for smooth Markov equilibria, but these require stochastic shocks which are absent
from our presentation.17
4.1 Distortion-Adjusted Euler Equation
The applied model in the previous Section introduced the idea of a distortion function. The
distortion function represents the wedge in one’s long run payoﬀs arising from the conﬂict
between one’s own preferences and that of the decision maker. This conﬂict distorts the




∗(ωt)) + δ DatQ(ωt,Ψ
∗(ωt)) · Dωt+1V (i,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) (14)
with ωt+1 = Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)). Generally, ∆(i,ωt;Ψ∗) describes the marginal distortion away
from the i’s critical value when some possibly diﬀerent citizen-type makes the policy decision
in state ωt. Of course, in the special case where i = it = µ(ωt), i.e., i is the leader, then there
is no distortion. In that case, ∆(i,ωt;Ψ∗) = 0 describes a ﬁrst order condition for i = it.
Under permanent authority, it also follows that ∆(i0,ωt;ψ) = 0 since there is no distortion
16More recently this approach has been adapted to dynamic macro policy problems by Klein, Krusell, and
Rios Rull (2008), Krusell and Smith (2003), Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002), and Judd (2004), and to
dynamic political games by Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2004).
17A previous draft of this paper had shocks, but we took them out as they added little to the main ideas.
Aside from shocks, the remaining assumptions do not appear to violate any of the known existence results as
far we are aware. See, for instance, Amir (1996), Curtat (1996), Horst (2005), Lagunoﬀ (2008), and Novak
(2007).
20when i0 holds power forever. The distortion equation (14) can be written as
δDωt+1Vi = [DatQ]
−1 · [∆(i,ωt;Ψ
∗) − Datui] (15)
Next, consider an arbitrary citizen-type i ∈ I (not necessarily the leader) in the PE
equilibrium. His continuation value function in state ωt+1 is
V (i,ωt+1;Ψ
∗) = u(i,ωt+1,Ψ
∗(ωt+1)) + δ V (i,ωt+2;Ψ
∗) (16)
with ωt+2 = Q(ωt+1,Ψ∗(ωt+1)). To save on notation, we use the abbreviated notation ui =
u(i,·), and Vi = V (i,·). Diﬀerentiating this value function Vi with respect to ωt+1 yields
Dωt+1Vi = Dωt+1ui + Dωt+1Ψ






Iterating (15) forward one period while holding i ﬁxed, and then substituting it back into
(17) yields the expression
Dωt+1Vi = R(it,ωt+1; Ψ























Using these deﬁnitions, we substitute (18) into the ﬁrst order condition ∆(it,ωt;Ψ∗) = 0
of the date t leader it, to obtain the Distortion-adjusted Euler equation
Datuit + δ DatQ · [R(it,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) + P(it,ωt+1; Ψ
∗)] = 0 (19)
where ωt+1 = Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)). The Distortion-adjusted Euler Equation is fundamental to our
characterization of the general model. It captures the basic decomposition of motives of any
leader when power is policy-endogenous. Each leader weighs the marginal cost Datuit against
two types of marginal eﬀects.
Starting ﬁrst with the second eﬀect, the term P(it,ωt+1; Ψ∗), is closely identiﬁed with the
Faustian trade oﬀ. Intuitively, it describes the marginal loss in it’s payoﬀ which is brought
about when the policy induces a sequence of diﬀerent, and clearly less desirable, political
leaders in the future. These future leaders choose policies that distort one’s dynamic marginal
payoﬀ away from its critical value. These distortions begin with the decision at+1 made by
21it+1 whose preferences may diﬀer from it. We refer to P(it,ωt+1; Ψ∗) as the Preservation
Eﬀect because, as we later show, it induces Burkean conservatism by decision makers. In the
public investment model, the preservation eﬀect is given by (K + 1 − d)∆(it,ωt+1; Ψ∗) which
is negative, a fact that we later show is robust. Note that the Preservation Eﬀect vanishes in
the PA equilibrium. That is, P(it,ωt+1; ψ) = 0, due to the Envelope Theorem.
The Preservation Eﬀect may be partly oﬀset by a standard dynamic programming term
in the form of R(it,ωt+1; Ψ∗) deﬁned in (18.a). Qualitatively, the term R arises in the typical
Euler equations. Roughly, it describes the marginal eﬀect of a change in next period’s state
ωt+1 on next period’s payoﬀs after adjusting policy so that the subsequent state ωt+2 remains
at the level chosen by it+1 in equilibrium (since changes in ωt+2 come from next period’s leader
it+1, hence are part of the Preservation Eﬀect).
The ﬁrst term in Equation (18.a) describes the direct gain in it’s payoﬀ next period from
a change in ωt+1. The second term describes the indirect gain from reduced cost of the
policy in t+1. Speciﬁcally, a unit increase in ωt+1 lowers the required policy at+1 by Dωt+1Q·
[Dat+1Q]−1 in order to achieve the state ωt+2 that it anticipates will be induced by it+1’s policy
in equilibrium.18 In turn, this leads to a change in payoﬀ equaling this second term. While
the functional form R is standard, its magnitude diﬀers across PA and PE regimes. We refer
to the diﬀerence R(i,ωt+1;Ψ∗)−R(i,ωt+1;ψ) as the Reformation Eﬀect because it reﬂects the
net incentive distortion due to the productivity diﬀerences of a current policy choice in PE
relative to PA. A higher level of future investment under Ψ∗ may increase one’s incentive to
invest more today. From Equation (13), the reformation eﬀect in the public investment model,
for instance, is calculated to be (1 − d)(Ψ∗(ωt+1) − ψ(ωt+1)). Since ψ is stationary in that
model, the reformation eﬀect is increasing in the state. Using Proposition 1, the reformation
eﬀect is negative at states below a cutoﬀ ˆ ω, and positive at states above it.
Because the Preservation Eﬀect vanishes under permanent authority, the Euler equation
in the PA equilibrium is given by
Datui0 + δ DatQ · R(i0,ωt+1;ψ) = 0 (20)
where ωt+1 = Q(ωt,ψ(ωt)). Consequently, the net eﬀect on continuation payoﬀs of policy-
endogenous power, relative to permanent authority, is given by
Reformation Eﬀect z }| {
R(i,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) − R(i,ωt+1;ψ) +
Preservation Eﬀect z }| {
P(i,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) (21)
With the aid of a supermodularity assumption deﬁned below, we use these terms to identify
features of the PE equilibrium.
18Note that both terms in the expression for R aﬀect only payoﬀs in t + 1. This is because the eﬀect
on periods t + 2 onward depends on the marginal variation of the policy rules that come from variations in
the identity of the decision makers. These variations appear in the Preservation Eﬀect and would be fully
“enveloped out” in the standard, single agent dynamic programming problems.
224.2 Supermodularity and Monotonicity
A central feature of the public investment model is monotonicity. In one case, political power
shifts from lower to higher marginal valuation types, and this occurs when equilibrium policy
rules are increasing in the state. In the second case, the paths exhibit cycles, with dampened
oscillations between high and low valuation types. This occurs when equilibrium policy rules
are decreasing in the state.
The monotonicity of the policy rule in these cases owes not so much to the speciﬁc func-
tional forms, but (as we later show) rather to the fact that these functional forms are super-
modular. This is no accident. Supermodularity is the more general version of a collection of
commonly used assumptions (e.g., increasing diﬀerences, strategic complements, etc.), that
are generally used to establish monotonicity and/or well deﬁned monotone comparative statics
of endogenous decision rules. Here it is central in our eﬀorts to characterize Faustian trade-
oﬀs. In smooth (diﬀerentiable) models, the deﬁnition is straightforward. A smooth function
f : I R
m → I R is supermodular (spm) iﬀ DxjDxkf ≥ 0 for all j,k = 1,...,m, and f is strictly
spm if the inequality is strict.
First, deﬁne at = L(ωt,ωt+1) implicitly from the transition equation Q(ωt,L(ωt,ωt+1)) =
ωt+1. The function L(ωt,ωt+1) is interpreted as the policy cost of generating tomorrow’s state
ωt+1 given current state ωt.
(A1). Supermodularity (spm). The composite ﬂow payoﬀ deﬁned by ˜ u(i,ωt,ωt+1) ≡ u(i,ωt,L(ωt,ωt+1))
is supermodular in (i,ωt,ωt+1) and strictly supermodular in (i,ωt).
The composite ﬂow payoﬀ captures both the static payoﬀ eﬀect of a change in policy and
its future consequence through L. Hence, by placing joint restrictions on u and Q through
the composite payoﬀ ˜ u, Assumption (A1) is weaker than separate spm assumptions on u and
Q. Still, it is not unrestrictive. As with all spm assumptions, (A1) applies only to environ-
ments with suﬃciently strong complementarities between endogenous variables and exogenous
parameters and between diﬀerent sets of endogenous variables. It holds in most models of
capital accumulation via taxation by a government since a government’s current investment
typically increases the productivity of its future investment. In the public investment model,
for instance, (A1) is easily veriﬁed since ˜ u = f(i)ωt − 1/2(ωt+1 − (1 − d)ωt)2.
On the other hand, spm often does not hold in situations where there are free rider problems
as in, for instance, cases where public good provision is decentralized and voluntary. In such
cases, an individual’s marginal incentive to contribute diminishes the larger is the sum of
others’ contributions. The present model does not have this problem since public provision is
centralized through a pivotal voting mechanism of one kind or another.
23Theorem 1 Suppose that (A1) holds. Then in any smooth-limit Policy-Endogenous equilib-
rium Ψ∗, citizen-type i’s dynamic payoﬀ, u(i,ωt,at) + δ V (i,Q(ωt,at);Ψ∗), is supermodular
in i and at.
Application of the Theorem, combined with standard results in voting theory (for instance,
Gans and Smart (1996)) show that the Median Voter Theorem applies.19 Of course, for a
given µ this median may be weighted as in Equation (8). Theorem 1 implies then that there
exists a (possibly weighted) state-dependent voting rule such that the rule admits a pivotal
voter µ(ωt) in state ωt.
A secondary consequence of spm is that it allows for a straightforward comparison of PE
to the PA equilibrium based on the reformation eﬀect alone.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption (A1) holds. For each citizen-type i and each state ωt,
Ψ∗(ωt) ≥ ψ(ωt) iﬀ R(i,ωt;Ψ∗) ≥ R(i,ωt;ψ).
Under (A1), a well ordered evolution of political authority exists in PE equilibria.
Theorem 3 Suppose (A1) holds. Let Ψ∗ be a smooth-limit Policy-Endogenous (PE) equilib-
rium and let Θ∗(ωt) ≡ Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) be the associated PE equilibrium transition rule. Then,
Θ∗ is increasing, and for any state ωt ≥ ω0, Ψ∗(ωt) ≥ Ψ(i0,ωt) with strict inequality if
ωt > ω0.
The Theorem shows that the PE equilibrium transition rule is monotone in states, and the
hypothetical PE rule is more conservative (in the natural order on policies) in every state
than in the PE equilibrium. By itself, Theorem 3 does not say much about Faustian dynam-
ics. However, under a simple initial condition, the following Corollary asserts that Faustian
dynamics are monotone.
Corollary Suppose that, in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 3, Θ∗(ω0) > ω0. Then the
Policy-Endogenous equilibrium paths of states {ωt} and leaders {it} are increasing: ωt+1 > ωt
and it+1 > it.
The Corollary asserts that the PE equilibrium path of states and decision-making types
is increasing provided it starts oﬀ that way. Hence, current leaders knowingly lose power to
more progressive decision types, and this evolution continues until either a steady state is
reached, or until the largest (most progressive) type acquires power.
19Assumption A1 implies that the payoﬀ satisﬁes single crossing in i and at. Hence, the application of Gans’
and Smart’s result applies. See also Roberts (1998,1999) for another application of spm to a dynamic political
economy model of club admissions.
24Finally, spm is used to show that one critical feature of the public investment model holds
quite broadly. So-called “Burkean” incentives for conservative decision making are embodied
in the Preservation Eﬀect.
Theorem 4 Suppose (A1) holds. Let Ψ∗ be a smooth-limit PE equilibrium. For each state
ωt+1, P(i,ωt+1; Ψ∗) is increasing in i, and
P(i,ωt+1; Ψ
∗) < 0 if and only if i < µ(ωt+1) (22)
In particular, the result implies that political leaders act in such a way as to oﬀset, at least
partially, the loss of political authority resulting from their policy decisions. Hence if the
Faustian dynamics move toward more progressive leaders, then the Preservation Eﬀect pushes
the current leader toward a more conservative policy. If the evolution is toward less progressive
leaders, then the current leader acts more progressively. Combining Theorem 4 with the initial
condition that Θ∗(ω0) > ω0 implies that the Preservation Eﬀect is negative along the PE
equilibrium path: P(µ(ωt),ωt+1; Ψ∗) < 0.
4.3 Steady States
By deﬁnition, the Preservation Eﬀect vanishes in any steady state ω∗ = Θ∗(ω∗) ≡ Q(ω∗,Ψ∗(ω∗))
of a PE equilibrium. The identity of the leader clearly does not change once ω∗ is reached.





∗)) + δ DatQ · R(µ(ω
∗),ω
∗;Ψ
∗) = 0 (23)
From the deﬁnition of R(µ(ω∗),ω∗;Ψ∗) in (18.a), observe that Ψ∗ enters R only through
the value of steady state policy a∗ = Ψ(ω∗). Equation (23) therefore provides a joint re-
striction on ω∗ and a∗. Combined with the transition equation ω∗ = Q(ω∗,a∗), Equa-
tion (23) gives a condition on the determination of ω∗ purely in terms of economic prim-
itives. This fact can be seen more clearly in terms of the composite payoﬀ ˜ u(i,ωt,ωt+1)
deﬁned in Assumption (A1). By deﬁnition, ˜ u(i,ωt,Q(ωt,at)) = u(i,ωt,at) holds as an
identity. By taking partial derivatives of this identity with respect to ωt and at, it follows
that Datu(i,ωt,at) = Dωt+1˜ u(i,ωt,ωt+1)DatQ(ωt,at) and R(i,ωt+1;Ψ∗) = Dωt+1˜ u(i,ωt+1,ωt+2).




∗) + δ Dωt+1˜ u(µ(ω
∗),ω
∗,ω
∗) = 0 (24)
The steady state equation (24) expresses a simple marginal tradeoﬀ in the steady state. In the
public investment model, this tradeoﬀ was between present and future public sector capital.
Similarly, ω◦ = Q(ω◦,ψ(ω◦)) is a steady state in the PA equilibrium and the steady state
equation is given by
Dωt+1˜ u(i0,ω
◦,ω
◦) + δ Dωt+1˜ u(i0,ω
◦,ω
◦) = 0 (25)
25Theorem 5 Suppose (A1) holds, and let Ψ∗ and ψ be smooth-limit PE and PA equilibria,
respectively. Then
(i) ω∗ is a steady state of Ψ∗ iﬀ (24) is satisﬁed, and ω◦ is a steady state of ψ iﬀ (25) is
satisﬁed.
(ii) The PE steady state ω∗ is unique if
Dωt+1˜ u(µ(ω),ω,ω) + δ Dωt+1˜ u(µ(ω),ω,ω) is decreasing in the state ω. (26)
and the PA steady state ω◦ is unique if
Dωt+1˜ u(i0,ω,ω) + δ Dωt+1˜ u(i0,ω,ω) is decreasing in the state ω. (27)
(iii) Suppose that (27) holds for each i. Then ω∗ > ω◦ iﬀ ω∗ > ω0.
Properties (i)-(iii) are all satisﬁed in the stylized model. Hence, the conclusions of the Theorem
apply, indicating a degree of robustness of the steady state properties of that model.
Property (iii) is perhaps the most signiﬁcant of the three. It relates the long-run in the
PE equilibrium to the long run under permanent authority. It suggests that in the long run
at least, progressive change in policy is not hindered by political expediency.
5 Related Literature and Discussion
The dynamic link between policy and power shows up in a small but growing number of papers.
For purposes of relating these to the present paper, we found it most useful to separate them
into two groups. One consists of models of one or two-period lived agents; the other consists
of models with longer lived agents. As it turns out, there is an important diﬀerence which our
general model allows us to identify.
Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and Besley and Coate (1998) are early contributions
to the ﬁrst category of papers. They posit interesting two-period models in which a policy-
maker’s ﬁrst period decision inﬂuences voter choices in the second. A “political failure”, as
Besley and Coate describe it, occurs when policy-endogenous loss of political control in the
future lead to ineﬃcient policy choices in the present.
Similarly, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) explore a policy-endogenous mechanism that
works through education and its eﬀect on political participation. Policies that change the
level and distribution of education also change political participation across diﬀerent groups.
26Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004)’s policy-endogenous mechanism works through immigration. Im-
migration policy is determined by majority vote, and immigration changes the identity of the
median voter in the subsequent period. Campante (2007) examines a related mechanism that
works through campaign contributions. In this case, policies that change income distribution
alter the composition of contributions that, in turn, determine who is elected.
Hassler, et. al. (2003) investigate the evolution of the welfare state in a parametric
overlapping-generations model. A majority vote determines the level of transfers to unsuc-
cessful agents. Because the population sizes of diﬀerent types are endogenously determined
by individual investment decisions, their model can generate a shift of political power even
with majority voting.20
These studies highlight the broad array of mechanisms through which Faustian trade oﬀs
occur. We view the present model as complementary to these in that it suggests that equilibria
in these frameworks have elements in common. Our ﬁndings also suggest some possible missing
ingredients. Because agents in these models live (at most) two periods, the Faustian trade oﬀ
is essentially one-shot. This means that a date t agent need not worry about the distortionary
eﬀect his policy has on distribution of power beyond t + 1. In other words, these models
have a reformation eﬀect but no preservation eﬀect. This is signiﬁcant because the two eﬀects
often work in opposite directions. Our results suggest that the time paths of models with and
without the preservation eﬀect would be quite diﬀerent.
Recent papers by Azzimonti (2005) and Ortega (2005) do have preservation eﬀects in mod-
els with inﬁnitely lived agents. Like Dolmas’ and Huﬀman’s model, Ortega (2005) studies a
natural policy-endogenous mechanism in the form of immigration. Ceteris paribus, current
residents want to admit immigrants with complementary skills. On the other hand such immi-
grants are future voters who will vote to admit future immigrants whose skills are substitutes
to those of the current residents. Azzimonti (2005) posits an interesting model of dynamic
ineﬃciency in government. An ineﬃciency arises because the dominant faction loses power to
the other due to political shocks. She endogenizes the switching likelihoods between the two
factions by introducing probabilistic voting. When the shocks to voters’ ideological prefer-
ences for one group are asymmetric, then increases in public spending change voters’ relative
preferences between the groups, and so the identity of the pivotal voter changes as well.
Both these papers have something akin to both reformation and preservation eﬀects. Azz-
imonti, in fact, emphasizes a decomposition of motives in an Euler equation related to the one
in our stylized model.21 However, the focus of these models is elsewhere, and both models’
assumption of two political types/factions makes the Burkean conservatism of their decision
20Although, in their model, endogenous change in political power occurs mainly through private sector
investment decisions rather than directly from current policies. A related model and policy-endogenous mech-
anism is studied in Hassler, et. al. (2005).
21Interestingly, her decomposition also includes exogenous inconsistency arising due to shocks rather than
due to non-stationarity.
27makers diﬃcult to identify. The present study therefore recasts these papers in a new light,
allowing a clear view of subtle attributes that two seemingly diﬀerent models have in common.
Clearly, one would not want to argue that all policy choices involve Faustian trade oﬀs. In
fact, a parallel literature has arisen that “un-couples” policy from political power by allowing
the voters an explicit choice over political institutions. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2001, 2006), Cervelatti, et. al. (2006), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006a,b), Persson and
Tabellini (2007) and Lagunoﬀ (2008, 2009) all examine models of explicit institutional (de
jure) choices by current elites or majorities as a way of reversing or mitigating the deleterious
eﬀects of current policy on one’s future political fortunes. Similarly, Roberts (1998, 1999) and
Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (BMS) (2001) un-couple the policy-political choice by placing
attributes of a future pivotal or marginal voter directly in the preferences of the current voter.
In this sense, the policy itself is the composition of political power.
These “un-coupling” models make sense when current elites have the ﬂexibility to isolate
or reverse the consequences of their policy choices. Our mechanism is appropriate when this
ﬂexibility is lacking.
This contrast is apparent in a recent model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). Building
on an earlier framework laid out in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), they model the
policy decisions of an elite that explicitly preserve de facto political power when exogenous,
de jure changes in the political system moves the country toward democracy. They identify
“captured democracies” as those in which an elite’s investments succeed in preserving power.
The key diﬀerence between their model and ours is that in our model, policies generate
political change, while in theirs, policies are used by elites to undo (exogenous) political
change. Acemoglu and Robinson look to 20th century Latin America for numerous instances
of captured democracies. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the role of
Glasnost in facilitating the change in power, suggests a Faustian trade oﬀ at work. A decision
maker (Gorbachev) turned “Burkean” as he attempted moderate reforms that eventually lead
to a, perhaps unavoidable, loss of his own power.
Finally, we return to the policy decision of Lyndon Johnson which was initially presented
as an example of Faustian trade oﬀs. It was clearly part of a broader trend toward more
progressive civil rights laws. The eﬀects of Faustian trade oﬀs on incentives were apparently
widespread in this case. Rodriguez and Weingast (2006) describe, for instance, how the 1964
Civil Rights Act was watered down to minimize the political impact for Northern legislators.22
22As Rodriguez and Weingast describe it, concessions in the Act were made to garner support from Northern
Republicans. However, many Democrats as well as Republicans feared political fallout from Northern whites
at the time. See, for instance, Stewart (1997).
286 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the dynamics of a “Faustian trade-oﬀ” between policy and political power.
We characterize this trade-oﬀ in terms of a distortion-adjusted Euler equation that illustrates
the two main motives of a political actor: the desire for gradualism on the one hand, and the
need for policy reformation on the other. We demonstrate how the tradeoﬀ works in both a
stylized model of public investment, and in a general monotone model.
The parametric results focus on the interaction between political bias and distributional
change for creating a Faustian trade-oﬀ. When the resulting distortion is reinforcing it gives
rise to equilibria with monotone dynamics. By contrast, under a countervailing distortion,
one can have both monotone and cyclical dynamics, however only cyclical dynamics can arise
if the distortion is strong enough.
In either case, Faustian trade oﬀs turn political leaders into “Burkean conservatives” who
moderate their decisions in order to inﬂuence the future political evolution. This Burkean
inﬂuence on individual incentives is a key consequence of the Faustian trade oﬀ. However, the
Burkean inﬂuence must be weighed against the the dynamic change in political types when
assessing the overall eﬀect on the equilibrium path. In the short-run the Burkean inﬂuence
dominates when the PE equilibrium is compared with the PA model. In the long-run, however,
the “type eﬀect” dominates. This indicates that there are critical features in the transition
dynamics of the Faustian model that would not be evident by focusing only on steady state
properties.
A few modeling choices warrant further discussion. First, decision makers are assumed to
be exclusively policy-driven. Their desire for power is therefore purely instrumental. (This
is in keeping with the original depiction of Faust as a well-intentioned character.) There are
likely many historical examples of leaders who desire power for its own sake. It would not be
diﬃcult to incorporate “power-hungry” leaders into the model, however, this extension would
be, in our view, rather prosaic.
Second, we omit stochastic shocks. Decision makers in the model choose not so much
whether to lose power, but by how much and to whom. Consequently, we omit the case where
leaders are uncertain about the political ramiﬁcations of their policies. As it turns out shocks
do not fundamentally change the nature of the Faustian trade-oﬀ. They do introduce, however,
risk aversion into the motives of the leader, and for this reason, would be a useful addition to
future work.
On a related point, note that the model looks only at endogenous changes in political
power. Of course, there may also be incentive eﬀects due to exogenous political change.
These exogenous sources of change may be due to shocks, but they may also be built in to
the authority rule. Exogenous sources of political change would move the analysis closer to
29traditional models of dynamically inconsistent policy choice — for instance hyperbolic β − δ
policy models23 as well the famous ﬁscal policy models of Persson and Svensson (1989) and
Alesina and Tabellini (1990). In these models a marginal eﬀect somewhat similar to the
preservation eﬀect arises due to the conﬂict between current and future decision makers as
calendar time changes the identity of the decision maker. Azzimonti’s (2005) parametric model
shows this explicitly.
Third, the stylized (parametric) model generates some fairly speciﬁc results on public
investment, growth, and political change. Because the investment is assumed to be ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxation, no distortions arise other than that induced by the Faustian trade
oﬀ. This is by design, given the focus of the paper. However, recent papers of Battaglini
and Coate (2007, 2008) have made in-roads into our understanding of the dynamic political
economy of distortionary taxation. At this stage there is still much work to do, and in light
of the present results, explorations on the interaction between Faustian and tax distortions
seem well worth the eﬀort.
Finally, throughout the analysis, we keep the political institution exogenous in the analysis.
We focus only on the de facto evolution of the political power within a stable (de jure)
political institution. This allows us to examine the consequences of exogenous changes in
political institutions. By construction, the framework does not answer the question of why a
certain political institution is chosen and what determines the evolution of the de jure political
institution. Future work could investigate the interaction of the policy-endogenous political
power and policy-endogenous political institutions.
7 Appendix
Proof of Parts (i) in Propositions 1 and 2. For brevity, we combine Parts (i) of
Propositions 1 and 2, since the argument does not depend per se on whether κ > 0 or κ < 0.
We ﬁrst conjecture a solution Ψ∗ of the aﬃne form Ψ∗(ω) = (d − K)ω∗ + Kω where
K is a constant (in ω), though we later show how it varies with κ. ω∗ is the steady state
which depends on κ and κ0. The conjecture is used to characterize both Ψ∗ and Ψ, the
hypothetical rule. We establish a solution for coeﬃcients (K,ω∗) and establish uniqueness.
We then characterize the case with κ = 0, and show that K = 0 there. This case gives us the
PA equilibrium ψ.
Step 1◦. Verifying the Functional Forms. Using the aﬃne form as our “guess” the ﬂow utility
23See Laibson (1997), Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002), Krusell and Smith
(2003), Amador (2003), Judd (2004).
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For the purpose of solving for the equilibrium, we can drop the constant term. The continu-
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2 ,
where the last line follows from the fact that ωt+s−ω∗ = (K+1−d)s(ωt−ω∗). The last equality
above requires convergence of the inﬁnite sum which, in turn, requires K + 1 − d < 1
δ and
(K + 1 − d)
2 < 1
δ which combines to K + 1 − d < 1 √
δ. The hypothetical problem confronting
an arbitrary citizen-type i is
max
at
{u(i,ωt,at) + δV (i,(1 − d)ωt + at; Ψ
∗)}
which, when evaluated at the parametric assumptions produces the ﬁrst-order condition
−at + δ
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We return to the hypothetical equilibrium later. To determine the PE equilibrium, substitute
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We therefore have two equations, and two unknowns, K and ω∗. In what follows, we verify
that there exists a unique pair (K,ω∗) that satisfy (31) and (32).
Step 2◦. Existence and uniqueness of the pair (K,ω∗). The equation for K in (31) can be
expressed as
K +
δK2 (K + 1 − d)
1 − δ (K + 1 − d)
2 −
δκ
1 − δ (K + 1 − d)
= 0. (33)
Deﬁne b K = K + 1 − d. Multiply both sides of the equation (33) by
 
1 − δ (K + 1 − d)
2
(1 − δ (K + 1 − d))
and after some messy algebra, the equation (33) becomes
F( b K) ≡ δ (1 − d) b K3 +
 


















Observe that the function F is of the form F( b K) = a0(κ)+a1 b K +a2(κ) b K2+a3 b K3 (given
the expression above, it should be clear that a0 and a2 vary with κ whereas a1 and a3 do not).
We then have
F (1 − d) = −κ
 
1 − δ (1 − d)
2
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Suppose ﬁrst that 0 < κ < d
 
1
δ − 1 + d

as required in Proposition 1. Then F (1 − d) < 0
and F (1) > 0. Then from the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a b K∗ such that
1 − d < b K∗ < 1 (or equivalently 0 < K∗ < d) and F( b K∗) = 0.






1+δ (1 − d) + 1
δ

as required in Propo-
sition 2. Then F (−1) < 0 and F (1 − d) > 0. Once again, we apply the Intermediate Value
Theorem to show that there exists a −1 < b K∗ < (1−d) (or equivalently −(2−d) < K∗ < 0)
such that F( b K∗) = 0.











a2(κ) + 3a3 b K

< 0 for −1 ≤ b K ≤ 1. Towards this
goal, it suﬃces to show that a2(κ)+3a3 < 0 (since a3 > 0), i.e.,

κδ − (2 − d) − δ (1 − d)
2
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which is always true since κ < d
 
1
δ − 1 + d

. We conclude that b K∗, and hence K∗ = b K∗−1+d,
is unique.
Having established a unique solution, K∗, we now solve for the steady state, ω∗, from











We have therefore established a unique pair (K∗,ω∗) with K∗ as the slope of Ψ∗ and ω∗ as
the steady state satisfying (35). As the solution to F(K + 1 − d) = 0, notice that K∗ varies
with κ. We write K∗ = B(κ) to emphasize the dependence on κ. By the deﬁnition of F in
(34), it is clear that B(0) = 0, which then yields an equation for the PA equilibrium ψ. As
for the hypothetical PE rule, Ψ, its solution form is also aﬃne. The coeﬃcients of Ψ can be
recovered from K∗ and ω∗ evaluated at their respective solutions. The slope is non-positive
and equal to zero iﬀ κ = 0 or d = 1.
Rest of the proof of Proposition 1. We now turn to Part (ii) of Proposition 1. To prove
that convergence to the steady state is monotone, observe that
Θ
∗(ωt) ≡ (1 − d)ωt + Ψ
∗(ωt) = (1 − d + K
∗)ωt + (d − K
∗)ω
∗. (36)
Since 0 < K∗ < d, if 0 < κ < d
 
1
δ − 1 + d

, then convergence toward the steady state is
monotonically increasing if ω0 < ω∗, and monotonically decreasing if ω0 > ω∗.
The rest of Part (ii) and (iii) can be readily veriﬁed from a straight-forward algebra. We
omit the details and only give a sketch for the case ω0 < ω∗. The comparison of Ψ∗ and
Ψ(i0,ω) follows directly from the aﬃne solution and the fact that f(µ(ω)) is increasing in
ω. The comparison of ψ and Ψ(i0,ω) follows from the higher slope of ψ and the fact that
Ψ(i0,ω) < ψ(i0,ω), where the latter can be checked easily from the solution. Given Part (ii)
33and the fact that the steady state is higher under PE equilibrium, Part (iii) then follows from
the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Rest of the proof of Proposition 2. For Part (ii), an inspection of (36) reveals that
DωΘ∗ > 0 iﬀ b K∗ = 1 − d + K∗ > 0. Recalling the deﬁnition of F in the proof of Proposition
1, it is clear that F(0) < 0 and F(1 − d) > 0 if 0 > κ > −(1 − d)/δ, and so the zero







1+δ (1 − d) + 1
δ

, then F(0) > 0 and F(−1) < 0, and so the zero of F must
satisfy −1 < b K∗ < 0. In the latter case, the Faustian dynamics constitute a dampened cycle
whereby, on-path, ωt < ω∗ iﬀ ωt+1 > ω∗.
The rest of Part (ii) follows from a similar argument as the corresponding part of Propo-
sition 1, with the main diﬀerence being a negative κ. Hence we skip the details here.
Proof of Proposition 3. we restrict attention to the case where ω0 < ω∗, i.e., the initial
state lies below the steady state. The logic when ω0 > ω∗ is symmetric.
It is easy to show that the steady state with κ is larger than that of e κ whenever κ > e κ.
Given this and the aﬃne form of equilibrium, to show the ﬁnal result it suﬃces to show that
Ψ∗(ω0) < e Ψ∗(ω0). Let K∗ = B(κ) and e K∗ = B(e κ) denote the respective slope of PE equilibria
Ψ∗ and e Ψ∗. We want to show that,






















which is equivalent to








B(κ) − B(e κ)
κ − e κ
. (37)
In words, the last inequality requires that the slope between the points (e κ,B(e κ)) and (κ,B(κ))
is larger than that between (e κ,B(e κ)) and (d(1
δ − 1 + d),d) whenever κ > e κ.
To proceed, we need to further characterize the properties of the solution K∗ = B(κ). But
since K∗ and b K∗ diﬀer only by a constant, we examine properties of the solution b B(κ) ≡







































> 0, b B(κ) is continuously diﬀerentiable from Implicit Function Theorem. In
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1−δ(1−d2) . Consequently, the sign of b B00 (κ) is the same as that of
b B(κ) − b(κ).
In the following part, we show that there exists a unique 0 < κ < d(1
δ − 1 + d) such that
(i) b B(κ) > b(κ) for κ < κ; (ii) b B (κ) = b(κ) for κ = κ; (iii) b B (κ) < b(κ) for κ > κ. To start
with, it is easy to see that b B (0) > b(0) and b B(d(1





δ − 1 + d

. From the
Intermediate Value Theorem there exists a κ such that b B (κ) = b(κ).
Now we show that b B(κ) > b(κ) for κ < κ and b B(κ) < b(κ) for κ > κ. To show this, let
G(κ) = F (b(κ)) = a3 (b(κ))
3 + a2 (κ)(b(κ))
2 + a1b(κ) + a0 (κ).






0 (κ) + 2a2 (κ)b(κ)b
0 (κ) + δ (b(κ))
2 + a1b
0 (κ) − 1

,
which equals to a quadratic form in b(κ),
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= δ (δ − 1)
 
1 − δ (1 − d)
2
< 0.
Combine this with the positive quadratic coeﬃcient, i.e., δd2−4δd+1+3δ = δd2+(1 − δd)+
3δ (1 − d) > 0, we know that G0 (κ) > 0 for every κ. As a result, G(κ) < 0 for κ < κ and
G(κ) > 0 for κ > κ. Therefore, b B (κ) > b(κ) for κ < κ and b B(κ) < b(κ) for κ > κ.
Translating back to our original coeﬃcient, B(κ), we have thus established: B0(κ) > 0,
and B00(κ) > 0 for κ < ¯ κ and B00(κ) < 0 for κ > ¯ κ. In addition, it is easy to check that
B0(0) = 1
1
δ−1+d, B(0) = 0, and B(d(1
δ − 1 + d)) = d. These properties together implies that
B(κ) ≥ κ
1
δ−1+d,∀κ < d( 1
δ−1+d). Geometrically, B(κ) is an increasing function, convex below
¯ κ and concave above ¯ κ. In addition, B(κ) lies above the line κ
1
δ−1+d, with a unique tangent
point at κ = 0.
Now we are ready to prove the inequality (37) from a geometric argument. Given the
shape of B(κ) established earlier, a simple graph shows that the inequality (37) always holds
for κ < d( 1
δ−1+d). This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is contained in the Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 2 From deﬁnition, u(i,ω,a) = ˜ u(i,ω,Q(ω,a)). Use this fact to replace
u with ˜ u in equation (18.a), after some algebra it follows that
R(i,ωt,Ψ
∗) = Dωt˜ u(i,ωt,Θ
∗(ωt)), (38)
where Θ∗(ωt) = Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) for any Ψ∗ (including permanent authority equilibrium ψ(ω)).
From (A1), R(i,ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) > R(i,ωt,ψ(ωt)) if and only if Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) > Q(ωt,ψ(ωt)). From
the monotonicity of Q(ω,a) in a, Q(ωt,Ψ∗(ωt)) > Q(ωt,ψ(ωt)) if and only if Ψ∗(ωt) > ψ(ωt).
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3 For any arbitrary, smooth, strict supermodular continuation value
U(i,ω), deﬁne
H(i,ωt,at,U) = u(i,ωt,at) + δ U(i,Q(ωt,at)). (39)
H(i,ωt,at,U) is the payoﬀ function of a citizen-type i in state ωt when his continuation is de-
ﬁned by U(i,ωt+1). Let Ψ(i,ω,U) ∈ argmaxa H(i,ωt,at,U), and let Ψ∗(ω,U) = Ψ(µ(ω),ω,U).
36To prove the monotonicity property, it is more convenient to work with a related repre-
sentation as
e H(i,ωt,ωt+1, U) = ˜ u(i,ωt,ωt+1) + δU(i,ωt+1), (40)
where ˜ u(i,ωt,ωt+1) is deﬁned in Assumption (A1). Deﬁne Θ(i,ω,U) ∈ argmaxωt+1 e H(i,ωt,ωt+1,U)
and Θ∗(ω,U) = Θ(µ(ω),ω,U).
From the deﬁnition, it is immediate that H(i,ωt,at,U) = e H(i,ωt,Q(ωt,at), U), Θ(i,ω,U) =
Q(ω,Ψ(i,ω,U)) and Θ∗(ω,U) = Q(ω,Ψ∗(µ(ω),ω,U)). In addition, since DaQ(ω,a) > 0,
H(i,ωt,at,U) is supermodular in (i,a) if and only if e H(i,ωt,ωt+1, U) is supermodular in
(i,ωt+1).
We now proceed with the proof. From Assumption (A1), e H(i,ωt,ωt+1, U) is smooth,
supermodular in (i,ωt,ωt+1) and strictly supermodular in (i,ωt+1). By Topkis Monotonicity
Theorem, Θ(i,ωt,U) is nondecreasing in (i,ωt) and strictly increasing in i for any U. Hence,
we have shown that Θ∗(ω,U) = Θ(µ(ω),ω,U) is increasing in ω. Combined with Assumption
(A1), this implies that
DiDω e H(i,ω,Θ
∗(ω,U),U) = DiDω˜ u + δDωΘ∗ · DiDω0U(i,ω0) > 0.
As a result, the map U 7→ H(i,ω,Θ∗(ω,U),U) maps from functions with strictly increasing
diﬀerences in i and ω to functions of the same.
Consider, then the ﬁnite horizon PE equilibrium with horizon T. Let ΘT = {Θ∗
t,T}T
t=1
denote the PE equilibrium transition in the T-period model, and let Ut,T denote the value
function in each period t. Notice that UT,T = ˜ u which satisﬁes strictly increasing diﬀerences
in (i,ω) by Assumption (A1). 24 A simple backward induction argument establishes that
Ut,T satisﬁes strictly increasing diﬀerences for all t. From the deﬁnition of the Smooth Limit
Equilibrium, ||Ut,T − V (· ; Θ∗)|| → 0 as T → ∞, and V (· ; Θ∗), the inﬁnite horizon PE
equilibrium continuation value, has increasing diﬀerences in i and ω. In fact, by repeating
the step of the previous paragraph, it follows that V (· ; Θ∗) must have strictly increasing
diﬀerences in i and ω.
Consequently, the solution Θ(i,ω) must be strictly increasing in i, and so Θ∗ must be
strictly increasing in ω. This completes the proof of monotonicity of Θ∗.




∗(ωt) > Θ(i0,ωt) = Q(ωt,Ψ(i0,ωt)). (41)
From the monotonicity of Q(ω,a) in a, we have Ψ∗(ωt) > Ψ(i0,ωt).
24In the last period T, ω is chosen by the decision maker since there is no future return to the costly
investment.
37Proof of Theorem 4. From deﬁnition, Θ(ω) = Q(ω,Ψ∗(ω)), with the derivative
DωΘ(ω) = DωQ + DaQDωΨ
∗. (42)






We know that, Dat+1Q > 0 and from the proof of Theorem 3, Dωt+1Θ∗ > 0. Therefore,
P(i,ωt+1; Ψ∗) < 0 follows if and only if ∆(i,ωt+1;Ψ∗) < 0.
Let V ∗(i,ω) ≡ V (i,ω; Ψ∗) be the equilibrium continuation value. Using the deﬁnition of





Using the Proof of Theorem 3, which establishes strictly increasing diﬀerences of H in i and




∗) = 0 (45)
where the latter equality follows from the type it+1’s ﬁrst order condition in state ωt+1. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5. Part (i). The permanent authority case follows from the standard
argument. For the PE equilibrium, the necessity part is obvious. To see the suﬃciency,
notice that the equation coincides with the steady state equation of the PA equilibrium with
i0 = µ(ω∗). Since a PA decision maker faces fewer constraints than a PE one, if a PA authority
decides to keep the state constant, it must be the optimal choice of a PE authority.
Part (ii) is obvious given Part (i).
We now prove Part (iii), i.e., ω◦ < ω∗ if and only if ω0 < ω∗. Consider i0 = µ(ω0)
and i∗ = µ(ω∗). From the strict increasing diﬀerence between i and (ωt,ωt+1), for each
(ωt,ωt+1,ωt+2)
Dωt+1e u(i
∗,ωt,ωt+1) + δDωt+1e u(i
∗,ωt+1,ωt+2)
> Dωt+1e u(i0,ωt,ωt+1) + δDωt+1e u(i0,ωt+1,ωt+2),





















38if and only if i∗ > i0. Since Dωt+1e u(i,ω,ω)+δDωt+1e u(i,ω,ω) is decreasing in ω, the inequality
holds if and only if ω◦ < ω∗. To summarize, we have just proven that ω◦ < ω∗ if and only if
i0 < i∗, i.e., ω0 < ω∗.
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